1) FTA Report Does Not Diminish Need For Competitive Bid: the FTA report does not in any way diminish the need for a competitive bid of this project (aerial or tunnel) - the current sole-source, non-fixed-price approach is not in the best interest of the public.2) Tunnel Conclusions Inconsistent: if the FTA believes tunneling is too risky in Tysons, why does the current plan have short tunnels in Tysons (at -+ a diameter depth) and longer tunnels at Dulles Airport - also somehow almost half (50 miles) of the existing metrorail system and more than half the stations in Washington are underground without problem.
3) FTA Report is Not Final Position: the FTA report is only from the FTA Regional Administrator, not the FTA Administrator . . . so it is not necessarily the final word from the FTA or DOT on the tunnel.
4) FTA Reiterates that the Tunnel is a "Local" Decision: the FTA has said that the tunnel is a "local" decision and clearly does not want to short circuit the tunnel decision by reopening the environmental process for the tunnel without being requested to do so by the Commonwealth (or the Supervisors). Nowhere in the FTA response to the Tysons petition (the controlling document) does the FTA say they will not consider a tunnel if asked by the Commonwealth (or the Supervisors).5) FTA Report Was Not A Fresh Review: the FTA report was principally a rehash of the brief study that Carter-Burgess prepared for the Airport (MWAA) back in the winter (legitimate questions already raised about the independence of the C-B review) -- not a fresh review.
6) FTA Report Did Not Consider Key Expert Information: the FTA report did not consider the independent American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) expert panel report (not listed as a source document) which came to opposite conclusions on feasibility, geological information, utilities, tunnel depth, and schedule.
7) FTA Team Did Not Meet with Expert Tunnel Engineers and Builders: the FTA report team did not have the benefit of meeting with the tunnel engineers or contractors (some of the leading tunnel experts in the world) who have worked on the Tysons tunnel engineering for the better part of a year.
8) FTA Report Did Not Consider Key Contractor Information: the FTA report did not consider that a contractor has proposed in writing to build the tunnel for a fixed-price of $410 million and take on all the geological and schedule risks (not listed as a source document)... addressing most of the issues/concerns raised in the FTA report.
9) FTA Report Cost Estimate Not Bad News: even if one takes the FTA report analysis on tunnel cost without the benefit of the information about lower contractor fixed-price for the tunnel, the FTA report still says that the tunnel is only $214-$298 million more than the aerial which is
a. only 8%-11% of the current $2.647 billion budget for the Phase I aerial (compared to 28% more back in 2002 when the tunnel was first passed over by the FTA),
b. smaller than the $300 million in additional 1970's dollars spent to place the Arlington corridor underground, and
c. less than half the $582 million cost increase in the Phase I aerial in just the last 12 months under the sole-source contracting structure.
10) FTA Posture Not Surprising: the FTA report seems aimed at preparing to fend off environmental litigation which the FTA expects to come and should be viewed through that lens.