Media Matters has caught Frank Wolf's perpetuating his misrepresentation. Blasting NPR for failing to note the inconsistency in Wolf's dueling impressions of the same trip, they noted also that Wolf himself acted like he always concerned about Iraq:
WOLF: Well, it was my third trip to Iraq, and the first two times I was with my chief of staff, Dan Scandling. We were by ourselves, without any military, and we drove through the entire country. The third time, we were with the military and, every time I've been there, we've always spent our time outside the Green Zone. I could see the difference. Some things were better -- schools were open, hospitals were much better than they were the first and second time -- but some things were much worse, and that is the security issue. The first two times we drove all over, lived with Iraqis, and this last time I could see that that was not possible.Of course, if you read the Post op-ed we linked before, his description does little to tell his constituents about these security concerns. Now, in his interview with NPR, he's acting like security was paramount in mind at that time:
So, it just seemed that we needed to take a -- as you said, or as I've said in the report -- a fresh eyes: to get a group of people, bipartisan, who love their country more than they love their political party.But, wait a minute. Is that what he told us in his 2005 op-ed?
These underreported but significant successes could be explored by the group tasked with reviewing our efforts in Iraq. The review would essentially provide "fresh eyes on the target" and assure Americans -- no matter what their positions are on the war -- that every effort is being made to protect our troops and realize our goal of a secure and peaceful Iraq. While the Bush administration has sent other teams to Iraq to assess the situation, the "fresh eyes" review I propose would be different in that, rather than just reporting back to the president, the secretary of defense or the secretary of state, this group would report to the American public. It would assess answers to questions such as:It's hard to describe Wolf's vision of the group as much more than an attempt to resell the so-called successes and the alleged risks of failure to the American people. Indeed, the only reality the President needed to face back then, according to Wolf, is that the public isn't appreciating the progress being made. Nothing about the President not getting it on the security issue. The "center of gravity" is the hearts and minds of the American public, according to Wolf circa 2005, not the sectarian civil strife or insurgency or terrorists or anything involving security in Iraq.-+ How accurate a picture do we have of the insurgency?
-+ What can we do to get better tactical intelligence on the enemy?
-+ How reliable and effective is the growing Iraqi security establishment and what is its ethnic makeup?
-+ What will it take in terms of resources, organization and time to effectively control Iraq's borders?
-+ What criteria should guide the pace of withdrawal of American and coalition forces?
In making its report to the American public, this group would also be assigned the task of outlining the potential consequences of failure in Iraq. During my trip I asked everyone I met with -- from members of the Iraqi leadership to senior military officers to State Department personnel -- what "failure" in Iraq would mean to the United States and the world. The responses were chilling. Most agreed there would be civil war, leading to chaos and the creation of another safe harbor for terrorists, reminiscent of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Many said the entire Persian Gulf region would become destabilized, possibly leading to the downfall of the governments of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I heard references to Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, with its ethnic cleansing. U.S. credibility also is at stake. Reformers throughout the region would believe that America is a fair-weather friend, not to be depended upon, and the fragile seeds of democratic reform would be destroyed before they even took root.
The Bush administration needs to face the reality that a growing number of Americans are becoming skeptical of our efforts, partly because they do not have the benefit of seeing the entire picture. No one I talked to during my recent trip believes we will lose the war on the ground in Iraq; it's here at home that they are concerned about. One general told me point-blank that the "center of gravity" for our success in Iraq is the American public.
For the United States to stay the course in Iraq the public needs to fully appreciate the progress that has been made, be able to trust that those directing the war have made an honest assessment of what has gone right and what has gone wrong, and understand the potentially cataclysmic consequences of walking away from Iraq before the job is done.
In other words, the ISG group was billed as a P.R. offensive by Wolf in 2005.
Now, he says to NPR that because "some things were much worse, and that is the security issue, ... it just seemed that we needed to take a -- as you said, or as I've said in the report -- a fresh eyes: to get a group of people, bipartisan, who love their country more than they love their political party." What a surprise - nothing about needing to tell the public about Iraq's successes in Wolf's explanation in November 2006!
The gall of this guy. You'd think he'd want to lay low because of his glaring inconsistencies on Iraq. Instead, he's brazenly lying about them right here and now.
I think Issue #1 for Frank Wolf's 2008 opponent is starting to take shape: Why did Frank Wolf lie to his constituents about Iraq in Oct. 2005 ... and lie some more in Nov. 2006?