No doubt we need them - there's simply too much opportunity for failure or corruption (both intended and unintended).

Although I'm not sure I understand the argument against them that you use.  As far as I can figure, the paper receipt should be dropped in a ballot box at the voting station after the voter visually confirms it.  That way the election officials would have both the electronic version and the paper version in hand for recounts and random confirmations (matching the electronic against the paper). 

If every person was simply given a receipt there would be no trail for the election officials to follow - it would only serve as a print out of what the voter entered.  Which is fine unless something goes wrong or someone intentionally screwed with the machine.  But aren't the screw ups and cheating the whole reason for paper ballots?  For example, if someone was cheating the system and had already broken into the machine, they'd just have to print out a receipt that matches the actual vote but electronically record whatever they wanted. 

So the whole paper trail makes no sense to me unless the election officials end up with both the electronic vote and the paper vote.  If this is done poorly it will not only cost more money, but will provide a false sense of security.

But I'm glad to hear there are more voices pushing in this direction.

The argument I provided is what I constantly hear naysayers bring up when faced with the question as to why NOT have a paper trail.  Frankly, I think they doth protest too much.  :)

that require exactly what this bill says.  They were carried over from 2006 and will be acted on this coming year. 
  I hope this delegate will join in with the already existing bills instead of introucing redundancy.  This process is slow enough.  We need to get these changes through for next year if possible so they can take effect before Nov. 2008.

For detailed links to the bills already on the books go
See: Virginia Verified Voting http://www.vavv.org/
or Verified voting: http://www.verifiedv...

In the proposed bills the requirement is not for a receipt, but for a paper print-out of the voters intentions (I.E. an official paper record of the vote cast).  This print-out then would be kept at the polling station, and in effect, would act as the official ballot.  The polling computers would only be used as a counting device.  Whereas, the paper ballots would be the official, hard-copy, voting record, and they would allow for manditory-random audits (and recounts when needed).

AGAIN THESE PAPER PRINT-OUTS WOULD NOT BE "RECEIPTS"

AND WOULD NOT LEAVE THE PRECINCT!!!!! They would be official copies of the ballot and would be treated accordingly.

They just don't make much sense otherwise.

If there were "real" arguments against paper ballots, they'd be

1. The extra time required during the voting procedure (vote, print, and stuff the ballot box).  This could be significant for high turnout elections.

2. A system that would make sure every paper ballot is submitted.

3. Voter confusion about how the new system works (see number 1).

But I'm still very much in favor of the paper trail.  There will be some growing pains but it'll be worth it in the long run.

We threw the baby out with the bathwater after 2000 when many counties changed over from paper ballots to computers.

In Fauquier county and a few other Virginia counties,the  ballots are paper - heavy card stock- which we then feed into one tabulating machine per precinct.  It is very simple, fast and efficient. 

Best of all:
1. An official hard copy (paper) record exists for each vote.

2. The vote totals are tallied immediately.

3. Only one tabulating machine is needed per precinct (think $$ savings).

4. The number of voting booths is limitless, simple and low-tech. (Each booth is basically a simple, fold-up table) (Not $1000s /each like the electronic balloting booths.)

5. If the tabulating machine breaks or miscounts, the votes are still secure.  They are hardcopies and can be counted by hand or counted when the machine is fixed.

6. Audits are possible to verify that the tallies match the actual ballots cast. (Keep those vote counters honest.)

7. During recounts, the ability to hand-count (for highest accuracy) is possible.  Not so with electronic ballots.

8. Paper cannot be "hacked" from remote locations, and the "source code" for paper ballots is obvious.  Not so for electronic ballots.

Support and join Verified Voting .org and Virginia Verified Voting: http://www.verifiedv... & http://www.vavv.org/
& http://www.verifiedv...

They are very easy to test as well. Before the election you can run a test to ensure the totals are correct by inserting multiple ballots with undervotes, overvotes - which kick-out immediately, and all combinations of the candidates on the ballot.

I believe it is the best "automated voting machine" available.  If all else fails, you have the paper ballot to recount.

They are about 99.8% reliable as well.

If one breaks down, they put the paper ballots in the lock box and run them through  - with witnesses - when the machine comes back up.

When the polls close you can count the number of votes on the machine, the paper ballots and the poll workers check off sheets.

Glad to see the ball rolling on this. It took another year of glitches to convince folks that something needs to be done. The Secretary of State of Nevada took the bold step in 2003 and demanded that DRE's have a paper component. The vender complied. Also see that Diebold has taken the next step in offering a paper trail solution with their touchscreens.

Here is NEV secretary of State announcement from 2003
http://sos.state.nv....

Here is Diebold's 2005 press release:
  http://www6.diebold....