Man, I really need to pry open my wallet and subscribe to Stratfor; they have some of the best, most objective, non-partisan analysis on international relations - including the Middle East, where you rarely see anything that isn't wildly biased one way or the other - you can get (hey guys, if you want some good publicity, give me a free subscription and you've got it!). I particularly love today's analysis on the prospects for a Middle East peace settlement, as it's intelligent, balanced, level-headed, and delightfully contrary to the drumbeat we've been hearing for several years now about how war is supposedly "imminent" with Iran, Syria, etc., etc. Au contraire:
...a peace deal - and a locally crafted one at that - has moved from the realm of the improbable to not merely the possible, but perhaps even the imminent.Israel and Syria are looking to bury the hatchet, somewhere in the Golan Heights most likely, and they are doing so for their own reasons. Israel has secured deals with Egypt and Jordan already, and the Palestinians - by splitting internally - have defeated themselves as a strategic threat. A deal with Syria would make Israel the most secure it has been in millennia.
Syria, poor and ruled by its insecure Alawite minority, needs a basis of legitimacy that resonates with the dominant Sunni population better than its current game plan: issuing a shrill shriek whenever the name "Israel" is mentioned. The Alawites believe there is no guarantee of support better than cash, and their largest and most reliable source of cash is in Lebanon. Getting Lebanon requires an end to Damascus' regional isolation, and the agreement of Israel.The outline of the deal, then, is surprisingly simple: Israel gains military security from a peace deal in exchange for supporting Syrian primacy in Lebanon. The only local loser would be the entity that poses an economic challenge (in Lebanon) to Syria, and a military challenge (in Lebanon) to Israel - to wit, Hezbollah.
Hezbollah, understandably, is more than a little perturbed by the prospect of this tightening noose. Syria is redirecting the flow of Sunni militants from Iraq to Lebanon, likely for use against Hezbollah. Damascus also is working with the exiled leadership of the Palestinian group Hamas as a gesture of goodwill to Israel. The French - looking for a post-de Gaulle diplomatic victory - are re-engaging the Syrians and, to get Damascus on board, are dangling everything from aid and trade deals with Europe to that long-sought stamp of international approval. Oil-rich Sunni Arab states, sensing an opportunity to weaken Shiite Hezbollah, are flooding petrodollars in bribes - that is, investments - into Syria to underwrite a deal with Israel.
While the deal is not yet a fait accompli, the pieces are falling into place quite rapidly. Normally we would not be so optimistic, but the hard decisions - on Israel surrendering the Golan Heights and Syria laying preparations for cutting Hezbollah down to size - have already been made. On July 11 the leaders of Israel and Syria will be attending the same event in Paris, and if the French know anything about flair, a handshake may well be on the agenda.
It isn't exactly pretty - and certainly isn't tidy - but peace really does appear to be breaking out in the Middle East.
You think that's good news? Check out Strafor's analysis on a possible rapprochment between...hold onto your hats...the United States and Iran!
Iran is involved in negotiations far more complex and profound than anything that currently occupies Israel and Syria. Tehran and Washington are attempting to forge an understanding about the future of Iraq. The United States wants an Iraq sufficiently strong to restore the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and thus prevent any Iranian military incursion into the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula. Iran wants an Iraq that is sufficiently weak that it will never again be able to launch an attack on Persia. Such unflinching national interests are proving difficult to reconcile, but do not confuse "difficult" with "impossible" - the positions are not mutually exclusive. After all, while both want influence, neither demands domination.Remarkable progress has been made during the past six months. The two sides have cooperated in bringing down violence in Iraq, now at its lowest level since the aftermath of the 2003 invasion itself. Washington and Tehran also have attacked the problems of rogue Shiite militias from both ends, most notably with the neutering of Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia, the Medhi Army. Meanwhile, that ever-enlarging pot of Sunni Arab oil money has been just as active in Baghdad in drawing various groups to the table as it has been in Damascus. Thus, while the U.S.-Iranian understanding is not final, formal or imminent, it is taking shape with remarkable speed. There are many ways it still could be derailed, but none would be so effective as Iran using Hezbollah to launch another war with Israel.
So, what do you think of Stratfor's analysis? If it means anything, when I was at the Energy Department I used to speak fairly frequently with the guy (Peter Zeihan) who wrote this. Based on my dealings with Peter, I can definitively say that he's one of the smartest international analysts I've ever met. Take that for what it's worth...
In the midst of internal political turmoil, an at best marginally competent Israeli Prime Minister looking to deflect charges of corruption and hold together a tenuous ruling coalition might be willing to sell the farm to cling to power.
Any chance to attract financial support from anyone willing to underwrite the struggling Syrian economy is welcomed by an Assad. There will always be a rationale for walking away from obligations imposed by an "unscrupulous" Zionist entity later.
When the three occur in conjunction, you can bet a desperate deal cobbled together will reflect the tactical political rather than the strategic national interests of two of the nations. The third will smile all the way to the Swiss bank, the Bekka Valley, and beyond.
No, these developments at this time are not a prelude to peace. A convenient pause possibly.
Making a deal with Israel -- even if it's not a full-fledged peace treaty -- would be a radical departure from the modus operandi of how similar governments deal with internal domestic turmoil. Over in Iran, Ahmadinejad is incredibly unpopular domestically, so every few months he does something else to try and pick a fight with the usual suspects (Isreal and the "West," personified by President Bush) to bring Iranians together in the face of what the population perceives as an immediate external threat. This sort of thinking is fairly conventional for authoritarian regimes; on the other side of the globe from Iran, Hugo Chavez frequently reasserts his relevancy in a failing socialist economy by doing the same thing in Venezuela, most recently by responding to Colombia's anti-FARC operations with threats of imminent invasion (before backing down).
Any sort of diplomatic efforts between Syria and a traditional adversary therefore represents a different kind of thinking. It may not be the sort of thinking Stratfor suspects, but we may have to begin reevaluating how we deal with Syria in the future, and possibly how we deal with Iran.
On the Iranian front I'm less optimistic; we're surprised to find ourselves behind the 8-ball insofar as it is now the Iraqis who are demanding a time-table for withdrawl, and since not having boots on the ground anymore will significantly diminish our presense and influence, now may be the last, best chance to strike a deal. On the other hand, as mentioned before, it is in the domestic political interests of Ahmadinejad to maintain a tone of hostility with the West, and President Bush has been all too happy to indulge him. Should he be elected, John "Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran" McCain will almost certainly continue to indulge the Iranian fantasy that everyone is out to get them so they better support their otherwise-unpopular President.
I will be teaching English in the West Bank over the next four months, doing my best to fulfill the place of that "Catholic school" that helped bring rapprochement and understanding between two worldviews in the life of at least one man.