When the United States took the decision to take down the Hussein regime, there was significant dissent from Israeli intelligence and military leadership. That dissent was stamped down following a meeting between Bush and Sharon. Years ago, I spent time trying to get inside Ariel Sharon's decision process and used his military judgment during the Yom Kippur War to support an argument that his misguided tactical focus almost precipitated World War III; that a simple reliance on tactical victory can undo strategic success. That thesis was used in the operational art studies at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Bottom line was that General Sharon took so much pride in his tactical successes that he could not accept that they did not serve the higher strategic objective. The Israeli blood and treasure he spent as he advanced toward Cairo were wasted. The war was already a success. Israel abandoned the territory he gained soon after the cease fire.
Now it is easy to imagine President Bush diverting a na+»ve Olmert's focus from the greater threat of Iranian hegemony in the Gulf to the constant threat of Hizbullah terrorism from the territory of Lebanon. What is harder to imagine is how this discredited American administration could today convince Israel that war with Syria is a price worth paying for a minor tactical strike inside Syrian territory. Can Olmert honestly believe that America has Israel's back when the convoy he apparently ordered attacked had to have traversed the entire breadth of Iraq to enter Syrian territory, right under the nose of the American forces?
Or is it that we are inviting an attack on Israel by Iran for what some misguided tactician believes will give the United States a strategic imperative?